PARTY SYSTEMS AND IDEOLOGICAL DYNAMICSThe American Party System since 1932
A TYPOLOGY OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
THE NEW DEAL PARTY SYSTEM
Party Strength in Congress and the Presidency: 1928-1968
THE CRITICAL ELECTION OF 1968
Key Changes in the Party System since 1968
Party Strength in Congress and the Presidency: 1968-2002
Eras of Party Government and Divided Government
The Regional Shift in Presidential Elections
The Regional Shift of the Parties in the House of Representatives
CHRONOLOGY OF THE ERA OF DEALIGNMENT
Southern Electoral Votes in the 1968 Election
The New vs. the Old Republican Majorities in the House
IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM
The Ideological Spectrum of the New Deal Party System
Contested Party Nomination Processes and General Election Success
THE EFFECT OF THE ELECTION CYCLE ON PRESIDENTIAL IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING: MIDTERM ELECTIONS AND THE PULL TO THE CENTER
Six Year Itch or Two Year Itch?
Ideological Shifts of Selected Presidential Administrations
The American Party System since 1932
Democratic presidents in blue, Republican presidents in red, return to top
The New Deal Party System: 1932-1968 1932-1937, F.D.Roosevelt The New Deal Coalition and Ideological Majority 1937-1946, F.D.Roosevelt, Truman Democratic Predominance 1946-1954, Truman, Eisenhower The Republican Resurgence 1954-1964, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson The Democratic Congressional Majority 1964-1966, Johnson The Johnson Ideological Majority 1966-1968, Johnson The Shattering of the New Deal Coalition The Era of Dealignment:1968- 1968-1976, Nixon, Ford The Emerging Republican Presidential Majority 1976-1980, Carter The Temporary Revivial of the New Deal Coalition 1980-1982, Carter, Reagan The Reagan Ideological Majority 1982-1994, Reagan, G. Bush, Clinton The Changing Democratic Congressional Majority 1994-, Clinton, G.W.Bush The Republican Congressional Majority
A TYPOLOGY OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONSreturn to top
Not all presidential elections are created equal. Not all presidential elections have the same historical significance. Some elections put into motion a political coalition and a set of public policies that shape the nation for decades to come. Other elections have little long-term impact on the political system or public policy. It is useful to have a classification of the kinds of presidential elections based upon their impact on public policy and the party system.
Political scientists have coined the term "critical election" to refer to a presidential election that realigns the political system by setting in motion historical changes in party politics, public policy, public institutions, and political ideology which endure into succeeding decades.
Critical Elections: 1932, 1968 Ideological Majorities: 1933-36, 1964-65, 1981-82
Congressional Majority?: 1994
There are also elections where a presidential candidate has long electoral coattails that pull many members of his party to victory in congressional races and produce an "ideological majority." These elections do not permanently alter the party system, but they do create congressional coalitions that make major shifts in public policy which endure beyond the temporary electoral majority.
For a more detailed description of ideological majorities, see the Ideological Majorities, Presidential Initiatives, and Policy Change page.
An unprecedented type of key election occurred in 1994, when the Republicans gained their first enduring congressional majority since 1930. Republicans had been the minority party in the House in 60 of 64 years since 1930 and continuously since 1954 and in the Senate for 54 out of 64 years since 1932. From 1994-2000 the Republicans have held on to their House majority and only lost control of the Senate by one vote when Vermont Republican Jeffords defected to the Democratic party in spring of 2001.
The Critical Election of 1932
The critical election of twentieth century American politics is the election of 1932, which not only put FDR in the White House but also inaugurated an era of Democratic Party dominance of the national political system and historic changes in public policy and philosophy. The Republican Party had been the dominant political force since the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. From 1860 until 1932 the Republicans controlled the presidency for 56 of 72 years and held majorities in Congress in 48 of those years. But in 1929 the stock market crashed and the Great Depression began. A massive shift in political fortunes soon ensued as the Republican Party was blamed for the turmoil. In 1928 the Republicans had won their third straight presidential election and roughly 60 percent of the seats in Congress. In 1932 the Democrats won the presidency and gained control of both houses of Congress. By 1936 they had won roughly 75 percent of the seats in Congress and in the presidential election carried every state except Maine and Vermont.
More important, after 1932 the Democrats replaced the Republicans as the dominant force in American politics. The Democrats were able to institutionalize their gains. They held on to the presidency for 20 consecutive years. Their control of the House of Representatives endures until 1994, interrupted for only 4 of those 62 years. From 1932 to 1980 the Democrats controlled the Senate for 44 of the 48 years. The New Deal coalition that FDR hammered out withstood the test of time. The New Deal social bloc included northern white liberals, conservative white Southerners, northern ethnic minorities from southern and eastern Europe and Ireland, and northern blacks. The New Deal economic coalition included workers, farmers, the organized elderly, and, increasingly during the 1940s, elements of big business. FDR pulled together big city ethnic machines, southern courthouse politicians, and progressive reformers.
Party Strength in Congress and the Presidency: 1928-1968
____ = Senate, ____ = House,
= Divided Government return to top
The Ideological Majority of 1933-1937
These changes in party politics brought with them some of the most significant changes in public policy and political ideology in the twentieth century. The New Deal coalition dealt a decisive blow to the prior public philosophy of laissez-faire economics and institutionalized an activist role for government in economic and social affairs. Many of the programs Americans now take for granted, such as Social Security, federal insurance of bank accounts, and the collective bargaining between business and trade unions were established by New Deal programs created during the Roosevelt ideological majority.
For a more detailed description of the domestic policy changes of the New Deal and political developments during the New Deal party system, see The Triumph of the Activist State and American Ideologies in Historical Perspective pages.
From Democratic Dominance to Democratic Predominance: 1937-1946
Critical elections are historically significant because they set the basic structure of the American party system for generations to come by realigning the party system. They change which party dominates the political landscape. They construct a new coalition around a new issue or set of issues that changes the basic cleavage or polarization of the political system.
But over time a party system tends to lose strength. The political basis for a coalition erodes as the importance of old issues and old battle lines fades and new issues arise that divide members of the coalition from one another. The "out" party develops new issues and new ways of appealing to elements of the dominant party's coalition. New issues and new social cleavages will work against the prevailing political alignment, offering opportunities for the "out" party to become more competitive.
The pinnacle of Democratic electoral success of the early FDR years could not be maintained, and with some significant exceptions, the electoral position of the Democrats has been eroding ever since. The electoral comeback of the Republicans, however, has never been characterized by such a rapid and dramatic shift as occurred in the early 1930s.
The issue that signalled the breakdown of the Roosevelt ideological majority was the defeat of FDR's plan to increase the number of Supreme Court justices, or to "pack" the Supreme Court as his critics maintained. The Supreme Court had voided several key pieces of New Deal legislation as unconstitutional. In retaliation in 1937, following his landslide re-election victory, FDR sought the authority to appoint new justices to the Supreme Court who would back his legislative program. This unprecedented attempt to undermine the independence of the judiciary was defeated in Congress. In the midterm election of 1938 Democrats were dealt a decisive blow, losing 70 seats in the House of Representatives and 7 Senate seats. The period of programmatic change was over, and as the shadow of war fell over Europe, domestic issues receded and war preparation took center stage. The elections of the early 1940s were dominated by the war, freezing domestic politics in place until after the war was won.
The Republican Resurgence: 1946-1954
The Republicans began to recover from their stunning post-Depression losses in the congressional elections of 1938. In 1946 a war-weary people turned away from the Democratic party associated with the war and gave Republicans control of Congress for two years. However, the Truman upset victory of 1948 both delayed any Republican capture of the White House and returned control of Congress to the Democrats.
In 1952, led by the popular General Dwight Eisenhower, the Republicans gained control of the presidency and both houses of Congress for the first time since 1928. During the Eisenhower period a new pattern began to emerge: divided government. In 1952 the Republicans not only won the presidency, they won control of Congress, picking up 22 seats in the House and a crucial Senate seat.
The Democratic Congressional Majority: 1954-1964
However, in the period from 1954 to 1964 the Democrats were able to reassert their primacy. They regained control of Congress in 1954. In 1956, even as Eisenhower won a landslide reelection, the Democrats held control of Congress. In 1958 congressional elections the Democrats picked up 16 Senate seats and 51 House seats.
The pattern of divided government was based on voters splitting their tickets, voting Democratic for congressional and local candidates even as they voted for the Republican presidential candidate. As a hero of World War II, Eisenhower had a personal popularity that transcended party. But the party system was also changing. The party loyalties established during the 1930s were beginning to weaken. Memories of the Depression and of the FDR era were fading. New voters were entering the system who had never known FDR or experienced the Depression. Many families were now more prosperous and thus less receptive to appeals to class politics. New issues were arising that tended to divide the Democratic Party, particularly civil rights.
The Johnson Ideological Majority: 1964-1966
However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s the New Deal party system showed new life. In 1960 the Democrats recaptured the presidency. In 1964, following the assassination of President Kennedy and the building of the civil rights movements the new Johnson administration was able to pass the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and begin enacting Johnson's "Great Society" with the "war on poverty" legislation. In the Johnson landslide of 1964 the Democrats gained their largest congressional majorities since the early FDR years and enacted another set of sweeping changes in the roles of activist government.
For a more detailed description of the policy changes enacted by the Johnson Ideological Majority and political developments in the Kennedy-Johnson years, see The Triumph of the Activist State page.
The Shattering of the New Deal Coalition: 1966-1968
But the Johnson administration was the culmination of the era of Democratic predominance. The civil rights act and some of the programs of the Great Society were not popular with the traditional conservative southern Democratic base of the Democratic party. In the midterm election of 1966 the Democrats lost 48 seats in the House of Representatives and 4 Senate seats. The Democratic coalition shattered into several factions as anti-Vietnam War candidates drove Johnson from the presidential race and southern Democrat Wallace ran as an independent, carrying 5 southern states. The election of Republican Richard Nixon in 1968 signalled the end of the New Deal party system, although it was another generation before the New Deal coalition faded entirely from the political scene.
For a more detailed description of the issues in the 1968 election and the policy and political changes of the 1970s, see the Ideological Polarization and the Crisis of the Activist State page.
THE CRITICAL ELECTION OF 1968 return to top
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Key Changes in the Party System since 1968 Dealignment
The End of Democratic Dominance
Divided Government
Shift in the Regional Bases of the Parties
Ideological Polarization of the Parties
Dealignment
Although historical significance of the critical election of 1968 was not completely recognized until a generation later, it set in motion forces that changed the American party system in several crucial ways. In many respects the changes since 1968 can be seen as a dealignment. From the Civil War up until the 1960s most American voters felt a strong sense of loyalty and kinship to either the Democratic or the Republican parties. Beginning in the 1960s Americans turned more and more cynical toward the political process and vested less and less commitment to either of the major parties. The loss of confidence in government and the parties has been widely documented in opinion polls. It is so significant that many political scientists have chosen to name the new party system that has emerged as an era of dealignment.
An Historically Unusual Balance of Power between the Two Parties
One aspect of this dealignment has been the end of Democratic dominance of the party system. Since the Civil War, with the possible exception of the 1880s-1890s, one party has dominated the American political system. Pollster Samuel Lubell argued that the American two party system always had a "sun" party that dominated the system and a "moon" party which was overshadowed by the sun party. But since 1968 the two parties have fought on relatively equal terms. From 1968-1992 there was two separate majorities in the American political system, a Democratic congressional majority and a Republican presidential majority. The Democrats controlled Congress in this period (except the Senate from 1980-86), but the Republicans controlled the presidency for 20 of those 24 years. Since the election of 1992 there has been an even tighter balance between the parties. In 1992 Bill Clinton broke the Republican stranglehold on the presidency by being the first Democrat to win back-to-back presidential races since FDR. The Republicans took over both houses of Congress in 1994, and held them for consecutive elections for the first time since the 1920s. The closeness of the balance between the two parties was highlighted by the election of 2000, when Republican George W. Bush won the Electoral College and the presidency, despite getting fewer total votes than Democrat Al Gore. The initial Senate results were literally 50-50, although Vermont Republican Jim Jeffords defection to the Democrats in the spring of 2001 gave them a one vote edge. The Republican House majority was only 6 seats, the smallest margin in almost half a decade.
Party Strength in Congress and the Presidency: 1968-2002
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____ = Senate, ____ = House
= Divided Government
The Republican presidential majority coupled with the Democratic congressional majority produced an era of divided government. The reversal of the 1990s with the Democrats controlling the presidency and the Republicans winning Congress did not change the pattern of divided government.
Several factors have contributed to the emergence of divided government. It would not occur if voters were not splitting their tickets, voting for one party at the presidential level and another at the congressional level. Ticket splitting expresses weakening party loyalties among voters. Survey research shows that fewer voters identify strongly with either major party. Party is no longer as important to most voters as the character of the candidate. Most citizens today vote for the man or woman, not the party. As the system of divided government has persisted, individual voters have developed rationales for their split-ticket voting. Some voters talk of splitting their ticket as a kind of check and balance—putting one party in the White House and the other party in Congress to keep an eye on them.
Eras of Divided Government and Party Government in American History
Once the pattern of divided government began to be set, several factors tended to maintain it. Perhaps most important was the increasing ability of individual members of Congress to insulate themselves from the impact of national electoral trends. In the era of weakened party loyalties, incumbents have developed a series of electoral advantages that mean they tend to win reelection over time. If a member of Congress "brings home the bacon," that is, assists individual constituents with their problems with the federal bureaucracy and wins federal money for local projects, he or she can build political support in the district that goes beyond issues of party. The longer a member serves, the more seniority he or she accumulates, and thus the more "pork" he or she can win.
Incumbents also have the advantages of name recognition and fund-raising capacity. An incumbent can use the powers of office to keep his or her name before the voters throughout the term. A challenger gets no corresponding attention in the media.
The advantages of incumbency cumulate. The success rate of congressional incumbents is known to interest groups and political pundits. Interest groups generally prefer to back winners, for a loser can do little for their constituency. Therefore, the power of incumbency becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Campaign contributors favor incumbents because incumbents are the favorites.
The pattern of divided government is related to the changing regional bases of the parties.
The Shift in the Regional Bases of the Political Parties
The Regional Shift in Presidential Electionsreturn to top
For a more detailed description of the regional shift, see the The Historic Shift in the Regional Bases of American Political Parties page.
There has also been a remarkable and unprecedented shift in the regional bases of the major political parties since 1968. This regional shift actually began to appear in the election of 1960, but it became soldified as a permanent feature of the political system with the critical election of 1968. Since its founding by Thomas Jefferson at the end of the 18th century, the Democratic party had had its political base in the South. This was reinforced when during the Civil War the North was led by Republican Lincoln and the postwar northern occupation of the South was enacted by Republican congresses. The Republican party had first grown up in the West but developed a base in the Midwest and the Northeast in the second half of the 19th century.
This historical structure of the American party system was reversed in the second half of the 20th century. In the 1960s it was the Democratic party that presided over the "second reconstruction," the enacting of civil rights for African-Americans. Republicans, pursuing a "sunbelt" strategy" first opened up the South to competition in presidential elections, and since 1980 Republicans presidential candidates have done better than Democrats in the region. The regional shift was slower to emerge in Congress, but by the time Republicans won their congressional majorities in the 1990s, they were winning the majority of House seats in the South.
The Regional Shift of the Parties in the House of Representativesreturn to top
CHRONOLOGY OF THE ERA OF DEALIGNMENT
The Emergence of the Republican Presidential Majority: 1968-1976
The Johnson landslide proved to be the last hurrah for Democratic dominance of the presidency. The Republicans won the presidential election of 1968, and now have won five of the last six presidential elections, most by landslides. The coalition that elected Nixon has dominated subsequent presidential elections, creating a Republican presidential majority. The Democrats won more than 46 percent of the presidential vote only once from 1968-1992.
The Republican presidential majority is based on a new coalitional pattern. The formerly "solid South" the Democrats used to rely upon has gone Republican in five of the last six elections. While southerner Carter carried the South on regional pride in 1976, he lost it to Reagan in 1980. Conservative southern Democrats have increasingly placed philosophy above party in presidential choice. Memories of Republican Reconstruction have been replaced with association of the Democratic Party with civil rights and the welfare state. Urban ethnic groups have also loosened their ties to the Democratic Party. The more these groups have assimilated into the American mainstream, the less they have identified with the Democrats' championing of the cause of cultural minorities and the underprivileged. Young people, less influenced by traditional political ties and more influenced by the media presidency, have also moved toward the Republicans.
The key element in the creation of the Republican presidential majority was detaching the historically solid South from the Democrats. 1968 was the first presidential election since the end of Reconstruction that the Democrats did not win the deep South. In 1972 the Republicans swept every state in the South, for the first time in the history of the party.
Southern Electoral Votes in the 1968 Election return to top
Candidate Electoral Votes States Carried Nixon,
Republican59 Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, TennesseeHumphrey, Democrat 26 Texas Wallace, American Independent 46 Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, Arkansas The Temporary Revival of the New Deal Coalition
The change from one party system to another, while centered on one critical election, is rarely completely realized in a single election. The Eisenhower victories in the 1950s foreshadowed the Republican presidential majority that would become a more permanent part of the American political landscape after 1968. Similarly, the 1976 election represented a temporary return to the New Deal coalitional pattern, a kind of ghostly revival of the previous party system.
In 1974 the serious of scandals now labelled "Watergate" forced Richard Nixon to resign the presidency. In the 1974 midterm election the Democrats gained 48 seats in the House and five Senate seats. In 1976 the Democrats nominated southern governor Jimmy Carter, who was untainted by the multiple failures of Washington politics from Watergate to the final withdrawal in defeat from Vietnam. Carter was able to temporarily return the South to the Democratic fold, carrying 10 of the 11 states of the Confederacy, and thus barely squeak past incumbent Republican Gerald Ford, who had come to the presidency after being appointed vice president by the disgraced Richard Nixon. Carter, however, proved to be the last Democrat to win a majority in the South.
The Reagan Ideological Majority: 1980-82
The new pattern is divided government in which the Republicans generally control the presidency and the Democrats generally control Congress
Carter's election in 1976 proved to be the last hurrah for the Democratic New Deal coalition. In 1978 the Republicans gained 16 seats in the House and 3 Senate seats. In 1980 the Republican presidential majority resurfaced, as Ronald Reagan defeated Carter. 1980 also was a high water mark for Republican strength in Congress, as Republicans added 33 House seats and won their first majority in the Senate in 26 years by gaining 12 Senate seats.
The newly emboldened Republicans showed great ideological cohesion, uniting behind their new president's economic recovery program and conservative budgetary priorities of cutting taxes, cutting social spending, and inceasing the military budget. While the Democratic party technically controlled the House of Representatives, a caucus of conservative southern Democrats aligned with the new conservative president to give Reagan an ideological majority in both houses of Congress and the votes to pass his new economic and budgetary programs.
The Changing Democratic Congressional Majority: 1982-1994
There is still fierce debate whether Reagan's economic policies were successful in the long run, but in the short run they clearly triggered the worst recession since the Great Depression, with unemployment rising to a peak of nearly 10%. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Republicans suffered a blow in the midterm election of 1982, losing 25 House seats. This new strength put the Democratic party leadership back in control of the House, and from 1982 on Reagan and his successor Bush faced the same problems as Republican presidents Eisenhower and Nixon before them--how to deal with Democratic majorities in one or both chambers of Congress. In 1986 the Republicans lost control of the Senate and now both houses of Congress were under control of the opposition.
However, the Democratic congressional majorities of the 1980s were different from those of the New Deal era in one crucial way. As the Republicans had been gaining strength in the South for a generation, the Democrats also began gaining strength in the North. As late as the critical election of 1968 southern Democrats had made up more than 40% of all Democrats in the House. But by the mid 1980s, southerners were less than 30% of House Democrats and still shrinking. Turning that same data around, Democrats from the North, Midwest, and West were less than 60% of Democratic House delegations as late as 1968, but by the mid 1980s made up more than 70% of all House Democrats. Through most of the Era of Dealignment, the Democrats were recouping their losses in the South with gains in the rest of the country.
The Republican Congressional Majority: 1994-2002
Just as the American party system seemed to be stabilizing into a regular pattern of Republican presidential and Democratic congressional victories, in the early 90s the system underwent another upheaval. In the recession year of 1992 the Democrats were able to recapture the White House. For the first time in a dozen years the Democrats were able to establish unified party control of the White House and Congress. But their triumph was short-lived. In the midterm election of 1994 the Republicans won control of both houses of Congress for the first time in 40 years. More importantly, even as Clinton was winning re-election, the Republicans held on to congressional control. Divided government was still the norm in the 1990s, but now roles had been reversed. Democrats held the presidency but Republicans had crafted a congressional majority.
The New vs. the Old Republican Majorities in the House of Representatives
In the midterm election of 1994 the Republicans made gains in all regions of the country. They continued their advances in the South, winning the majority of House seats in the South for the first time in party history. But they also made significant gains in the Midwest and Northeast, in what had become the strongholds of Democratic congressional strength in the 1980s. The new Republican congressional majority was quite different than their last majority in 1952-54. In 1952 the Republicans had been almost shut out in the South, but now the South had become a Republican stronghold. The formerly Republican strongholds of the Northeast and Midwest were now the core of the Democratic congressional delegation. This regional shift cannot be understood without examining the changing ideological positioning of the parties.
IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE ERA OF DEALIGNMENTreturn to top
Ideology in the New Deal Party System
The Republicans have been able to construct their presidential majority by capitalizing on new issues and introducing new polarizations into the political system. The effect of these new issues and new polarizations can be seen by comparing the party system of the 1940s and 1950s with that of the 1970s and 1980s. The New Deal party system was centered on a polarization, or cleavage, based on economic class. The Democratic Party had the support of working people, lower-to-moderate income voters. The Republican Party had the support of upper-income voters. Most of the very disparate elements of the Democratic Party—union members, white Southerners, urban ethnics, small farmers, and blacks—were united by "bread and butter" issues, by the Democratic philosophy of using the activist state to aid working people. Economic issues also worked to the advantage of the Democrats because they were perceived as the party of good times, whereas since the Great Depression the Republicans had been associated with hard times.
In the 1940s and 1950s the party system was also characterized by very ideologically diffuse and inconsistent parties. In the early 1960s James MacGregor Burns characterized the New Deal party system as actually being a 4 party system, with both the Democrats and the Republicans having liberal presidential wings and conservative congressional wings. The only two presidents from the mid-1940s through 1960 had been Truman and Eisenhower, each identified with the liberal-to-moderate wing of his party.
The Ideological Spectrum of the New Deal Party Systemreturn to top
Liberal
Democrats
Presidential
NorthernLiberal
Republicans
Presidential NortheasternConservative Republicans
Congressional
Midwestern + WesternConservative Democrats
Congressional
SouthernIn contrast, a coalition of conservative Republicans and conservative southern Democrats controlled Congress. The conservative "Dixiecrats" faced no Republican opposition in the historically one-party South and thus had long careers. This gave them immense advantage in Congress, where powerful committee chairs were allocated on the basis of seniority. When the powerful Dixiecrats joined with conservative Republicans, they could control the content of legislation.
The Ideological Polarization of the Parties Since 1964
A new set of issues and political forces arose in the 1960s that changed this system. The civil rights movement and the Vietnam War introduced new issues that tended to polarize the political system along new lines. At first the civil rights movement worked to the advantage of the liberal Democrats. But since 1966 these new polarizations have been crucial to the Republicans' ability to construct a presidential majority.
Pressures to end practices of racial oppression, and particularly the official segregation of the races in the South, built throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. As blacks increasingly raised nonviolent opposition to segregation, the brutalities of the system were revealed on the TV screens of the rest of the country. White support for a redress of these grievances grew. After a number of halfhearted measures, in 1964 northern and western members of Congress united to pass a sweeping civil rights bill that banned discrimination in employment and public accommodations.
It is largely forgotten today that a higher percentage of congressional Republicans than Democrats supported the 1964 civil rights bill. But at the presidential level, conservative Barry Goldwater won the 1964 Republican nomination in part by emphasizing his opposition to the civil rights bill. Goldwater offered "a choice, not an echo." He was able to defeat the liberal wing of the Republican Party, which had dominated Republican presidential politics since 1940, through a strategy of uniting South and West in resentment against the Eastern, liberal establishment. However, in the general election Johnson defeated Goldwater in a landslide. This massive Republican defeat led to an unusually large liberal ideological majority in Congress from 1964 to 1966.
But the Republicans were not through with their "southern strategy." The politics of the South had been transformed forever. In this period, the association of the Democratic Party with civil rights opened up the once solid South to Republican penetration on racial and ideological grounds. At the same time, the enfranchisement of southern blacks set in motion the demise of the segregationist Dixiecrats. The Republicans' southern strategy added conservative Southerners to the party's western and midwestern conservatives. They formed the new center of gravity in the Republican Party, relegating the "eastern establishment" Republicans to the sidelines.
Social Issues
By 1968 racial tensions had heightened in the North as well. The nonviolence of the civil rights movement had been overshadowed by race riots in most northern cities. As racial conflict and the impact of civil rights legislation spread north, many northern whites came to oppose any further action on minority issues.
The party system was also affected by the escalation of the Vietnam War and the growing domestic opposition to the war. In 1965 LBJ introduced hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops into the war. But even this force was not able to turn the tide. As the war dragged on, protests against it spread much like the civil rights demonstrations that the war protesters consciously emulated. Clashes between student demonstrators and the police were added to pictures of cities in the flames of racial riots on the evening news.
These new polarizations worked to the advantage of the Republicans in 1968. Nixon emphasized what came to be called the "social issues." One of the key slogans of the Nixon campaign was "law and order." This slogan appealed to genuine concerns of city dwellers about the rising crime rate. But it was also a coded message that a Nixon administration would not be sympathetic to the positions of minorities and of student protesters. Whereas economic issues had united the traditional Democratic coalition, social issues divided them. As the importance of social issues grew, many white Southerners and urban ethnics were dislodged from the Democratic Party. This process was made easier by the fact that compared with the 1930s and 1940s, many southern whites and urban ethnics were more prosperous. The good times of the 1950s and 1960s had allowed of them to improve their economic circumstances. The historic Democratic association with the underprivileged had lost some of its appeal to middle-income voters even before such appeals came to be associated in many voters' minds with minority issues.
The election of Nixon in 1968 intensified the polarization of the parties. After 1968 the center of gravity of the Democratic Party was moved leftward. The segregationist Dixiecrats, the most conservative element in American politics, were becoming extinct. Freed from the political necessity of supporting John-son's Vietnam policies, the Democratic Party became the home of those opposing the war and calling for a rethinking of the U.S. role in the world. In 1972 the antiwar, anticorporate establishment, countercultural McGovern campaign captured the Democratic nomination and white conservative flight from the Democrats accelerated.
Since 1972 both parties have worked hard to gain the support of white Southerners and northern ethnics. But the quest for the support of the white conservative voter has affected the ideological consistency of the parties differently. The Republicans want to emphasize political philosophy, using ideological appeals to reach voters on the basis of chosen issues. The Democrats fare better when they emphasize historical cultural ties and downplay their philosophical differences.
Ideological Polarization in the Presidential Selection Process
A major factor in the ideological polarization of the parties was change in the way presidential candidates were selected. Since before the Civil War, parties had selected their candidates at national conventions dominated by powerfully entrenched leaders, often called party bosses. Since the turn of the century, opponents of the boss system had advocated primaries where all members of the party could vote on convention delegates as a way of democratizing the process. Over the years many states had adopted primaries. But until the 1960s the bosses still dominated the presidential selection system.
In 1964, however, the Goldwater insurgency capitalized on the intense support of its adherents to defeat the formerly dominant eastern establishment of the Republican Party. By making strong ideologically conservative appeals, Goldwater was able to win a large number of delegates in the primaries. He was even more successful in motivating his supporters to attend and fight vigorously in the party caucuses that selected delegates in nonprimary states. However, it was ideological conflict in the Democratic Party that dealt the boss system a death blow. Following the Goldwater example in the Republican Party, in 1968 the anti-Vietnam War candidates Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy sought the Democratic nomination by running in every Democratic primary and contesting every party caucus. Vicepresident Hubert Humphrey chose the more traditional strategy of relying on party bosses to control delegations for him. Humphrey did not put his name on a single primary ballot, and thus did not win any popular votes. McCarthy and Kennedy won roughly 6 million votes between them before Kennedy was assassinated on the night of the last primary. Yet at the Chicago convention the party nominated Humphrey as its standard-bearer. Not surprisingly, Humphrey lost in the general election.
While the antiwar forces lost the battle, they won the war. The manifestly undemocratic nature of such a system was clear. In an attempt to unify the party, the 1968 convention set up a commission to reform the future selection process. The McGovern Commission required the opening up of the party caucuses that the bosses had used to select delegates. They required that every delegation reflect the popular strength of the candidates in the state as well as the racial and gender mix in the state. They made operating caucuses so logistically difficult that many former caucus states switched to primaries. Since the McGovern reforms went into effect in 1972, no candidate of either party has been able to win his party's nomination without running in every primary and defeating his opponents in gathering popular votes.
But reliance on primaries and open caucuses to select presidential candidates is not perfectly democratic. The voters who tend to vote in primaries or attend caucuses do not reflect the ordinary voter. This minority "selectorate" tends to be much more ideologically consistent than ordinary voters. Those who vote in Democratic primaries are much more liberal than the general electorate, and those who vote in Republican primaries are much more conservative. The new presidential selection process has been a major factor in the ideological polarization of the parties.
The Muting of Intra-party Conflict in the Presidential Selection Process in Recent Elections
The presidential nomination process that emerged in the 1960s and 70s generally made for a long and contentious nomination campaign, beginning as much as two years before a general election and intensifying from the beginning of the election year up to the summer party conventions. It tended to leave even the victors bloodied and bruised, carrying the scars of negative images pinned on them by their nomination opponents. With the advent of ubiquitous TV cameras, sharp debate about party platforms and bitter floor fights made national party conventions spectacles of disorder that alienated rather than activated potential voters.
As the parties gained experience with the new presidential selection process, one thing became increasingly clear to leaders of both parties. The intense ideological conflict encouraged by the selection process could have disatrous results for presidential nominees. Being popular with the party faithful "selectorate" because of strong ideological stances could be damaging to the propects of success in the general election. In 1964, 1972, and 1984 candidates associated with the ideological pole of their party went down to stunning defeats--conservative Republican Goldwater in 1964, new liberal Democrat McGovern, and traditional liberal Mondale, all won less than 41% of the popular vote and less than 10% of the Electoral College vote. The one exception to this rule was Ronald Reagan, who despite being associated with the conservative wing of the Republican party won a decisive victory in 1980 and a landslide re-election in 1984.
By the 1980s, a more sophisticated corollary to the "ideological losers" thesis emerged. From 1964-1988, in seven consecutive presidential elections, the party that had the most bitterly ideologically contested presidential nomination campaign had tended to lose in the general election. This was clearly true in 1964-1972 and 1984-1988, and was arguably true in 1976 and 1980 as well.
The Relationship between Contested Party Nomination Processes
and General Election Success, 1964-1988return to top
year Democratic Nomination Process Republican Nomination Process Winner 1964 uncontested very highly contested Democrat Johnson 1968 very highly contested contested Republican Nixon 1972 very highly contested uncontested Republican Nixon 1976 contested highly contested Democrat Carter 1980 highly contested contested Republican Reagan 1984 highly contested uncontested Republican Reagan 1988 highly contested contested Republican Bush Political parties are organizations capable of learning. By the mid 1980s Democrats in particular had recognized that long drawn out nomination fights were weakening their presidential candidates. Between the 1984 election and the 1988 nomination process, southern Democratic state legislators developed a strategy to both mute the nomination struggle and push the party more to the political center. They revised their states' delegate selection schedules to create "Super Tuesday," a southern regional primary in which a large fraction of party delegates would be chosen on the same day, early in the nomination season. This "front-loading" of the primary process was intended to create an early winner and thus cut short the Democratic party's nomination struggle. Not coincidentally, that winner would have to have great appeal in the South, the most conservative region of the country, and so it was hoped a traditional liberal could not succeed.
Super Tuesday backfired on the Democrats in 1988. Ideological liberal Jesse Jackson's candidacy was actually propelled to the forefront because he won virtually all the African-American votes, which are still concentrated in the South, the old territory of slavery. Nor was southern favorite son Al Gore able use Super Tuesday to push northern liberal Michael Dukakis from the race. Super Tuesday also backfired on the Democrats in that southern incumbent Republican Vice President George Bush did sweep the South and thus largely eliminated his major rival, midwestern Republican Senate Leader Robert Dole. Super Tuesday had worked to mute intraparty conflict--only in the wrong party.
However, in the 1990s Super Tuesday had its desired effect, boosting the candidacy of moderate southern "New Democrat" Bill Clinton, and probably contributed to the Democrats recapturing the White House. By the year 2000 so many states had moved their delegate selection process to early in the nomination season that both parties' nomination process seemed more like a coronation than a contest. Former Senator Bill Bradley's challenge to incumbent Vice President Al Gore in the Democratic party was over almost before it started. Arizona Senator John McCain was able to mount a bit more sustained challenge to Republican front-runner Texas Governor George W. Bush, but a month into the selection process, Bush was clearly on his way to what by 1960s or 70s standards was a relatively uncontested victory.
THE EFFECT OF THE ELECTION CYCLE ON PRESIDENTIAL IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING: MIDTERM ELECTIONS AND THE PULL TO THE CENTERreturn to top
Honeymoons and Midterms
Presidential elections are not the only elections which exert influence on the ideological direction of an administration. The national congressional elections that are held at the midpoint of each presidential term in which the entire House of Representative and one-third of the Senate are elected can have a significant impact on a president and his party even though he is not standing directly before the voters. Because the incumbent president's party generally loses seats in Congress, midterm elections generally move administrations toward the political center. When a new president is elected, he is usually granted a period of good feeling and political support that will probably be uncharacteristic of the later part of his term. Citizens, political players, pundits, and even to some degree the opposition party wish to see any new president succeed in coping with the difficult policy problems of the nation. There is often a case to be made that the new president has won a mandate from the people, particularly if his party has also gained seats in Congress. A new administration has had little time to offend key political forces or voting blocs. This period of good feeling is often called the president's honeymoon. New presidents who have had long coattails, who have come to power along with many new members of Congress of their party, have a particular chance to use the honeymoon period to put their stamp on public policy. After the massive shift in party strength in the election of 1932, FDR turned his honeymoon period into the famous "hundred days" of legislation that created the New Deal.
Not all presidents enjoy such legislative success during their honeymoon period. If they face a Congress under control of hostile political forces, or if they are unable to mobilize their strength in Congress, presidents may find that the honeymoon period offers them little chance to mold public policy but only a temporary respite from political attack. Even if a president has a productive honeymoon period, his special opportunity to reshape public policy eventually comes to an end. Midterm elections are often a key point in the shifting political fortunes of even the most successful administrations.
The Six Year Itch in the New Deal Party System
After a party has been in power for a while, voters tend to turn toward the other party in congressional races. The New Deal party system manifested a widely recognized "six year itch," named after a famous fifties Marilyn Monroe comedy, The Seven Year Itch, in which a man married for seven years fantasizes about an affair with Monroe. The six year itch has also been seen in the Era of Dealignment, but so has a "two year itch."
The six year itch appeared six years after the establishment of the New Deal party system. FDR, elected in 1932, had bigger majorities in Congress and a greater impact on policy than any president in the twentieth century. The Democrats actually gained seats in FDR's first midterm election, in 1934. It was not until he had been in office for six years that the Democrats lost ground in a congressional election, but the losses they sustained in 1938 were great. The Democrats lost 70 House seats and 7 Senate seats and FDR's dominance of Congress was over.
Six Year Itch or Two Year Itch? return to top
The Six Year Itch House Senate 1938 Democrats
F.D.Roosevelt-70 -7 1958 Republicans
Eisenhower-47 -12 1966 Democrats
Johnson-48 -4 1974 Republicans
Nixon-48 -5 1986 Republicans
Reagan-6 -7 The Two Year Itch 1978 Democrats
Carter-16 -3 1982 Republicans
Reagan-25 0 1994 Democrats
Clinton-54 -10 The Democrats held the presidency for 20 consecutive years from 1932-1952. In 1952 the Republicans elected their presidential candidate Eisenhower and won control of Congress by a slim margin. In the 1954 midterm, the Republicans lost 23 House seats and 2 Senate seats, putting them back in the minority. But in 1958, at the ill-fated six year mark, the Republicans lost 47 House seats and 12 Senate seats, foreshadowing their loss of the presidency in 1960 to John Kennedy.
The Johnson landslide of 1964 gave Democrats two-thirds of all the seats in Congress. LBJ used this majority to pass a series of new domestic programs he called the Great Society. But in the midterm elections of 1966, again six years after the Democrats had regained the White House, the Republicans gained 47 House seats and 4 Senate seats. The Johnson ideological majority was over, and so was the innovative period of the Great Society.
The six year itch had serious policy repercussions in the New Deal party system, particularly for Democratic presidents. The Democratic losses in 1938 following the failure of FDR's "court-packing" plan in 1937 brought an end to the Roosevelt ideological majority and any further New Deal policy innovations. Similarly, the Democratic losses in 1966 brought to an end the Johnson ideological majority and any further domestic policy innovations of the Great Society.
The Six Year Itch in the Era of Dealignment
The era of dealignment was only beginning when the Watergate scandals crippled the Nixon presidency and eventually forced him to resign in 1974. Republicans paid the price for their leader's transgressions in the 1974 midterm election, losing 48 seats in the House and 5 seats in the Senate. Not coincidentally, 1974 was the sixth year of their hold on the presidency.
The last appearance of the six year itch came in 1986, in the sixth year of Reagan's presidency. In the past, the six year itch cost the incumbent party most dearly in the House of Representatives. The Republicans in 1986 were able to minimize their losses in the House, in part because they had already lost many House seats in the 1982 election. However, in the Reagan victory of 1980 the Republicans had won control of the Senate for the first time since the 1950s. But in 1986 all the freshmen senators who had been swept into office on Reagan's coattails were vulnerable, and the Democrats were able to regain their majority.
Two Year Itches in Recent Midterm Elections and the Pull of the Political Center
In the Era of Dealignment, the two year itch has affected three presidencies--Clinton, Reagan, and Carter. In each case losses in their first midterm election moved administration policy toward the political center.
Ideological Shifts of Selected Presidential Administrationsreturn to top
President Year Ideological Position
or ShiftExamples Clinton 1993 center deficit reduction budget
support for NAFTA treaty1994 shift to left health reform plan 1995-2000 return to center budget compromises with Congress
welfare reform billReagan 1981-82
domestic policy1981-84
foreign policyright tax cuts
social spending cuts
military spending increases
new cold war
strategic defense inistiative1983-89 compromise with center on
budget policybudget compromises
tax reform1985-89 shift to center on foreign policy arms limitation treaties
summits with SovietsCarter 1977-78 left-center energy plan
human rights positions
Panama Canal Treaty1979-80 shift to center, especially on foreign policy cabinet shuffle
grain embargo against Soviets
boycotting of Moscow Olympics
Iranian hostage rescue missionClinton's First Midterm Fiasco
In 1992 Bill Clinton was elected as a centrist Democrat, a southerner who self-consciously rejected the liberal political philosophy of previous Democratic presidents and presidential candidates. In his first year Clinton broke with liberals in Congress and even his own administration by rejecting new government spending or economic stimulus in favor of a long-term budget plan that emphasized cutting deficits. He also spurned organized labor and environmentalist groups by supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), winning endorsement of the agreement from Congress over their objections.
In part to compensate for the growing perception of Democrats that he would not fight for traditional Democratic issues, in 1994 Clinton shifted his ideological emphasis. In 1994 Clinton took his one major liberal initiative on domestic policy. He sought to pass through Congress a national health care reform bill that would ensure universal health insurance to every citizen and control rapidly rising health care costs through national regulations and incentives. Clinton's made his ambitious health reform plan his top priority in his second year, but was rebuffed by Congress, which in the end never even brought the bill to a vote.
Then in the midterm election of 1994 the Democrats suffered their worst electoral disaster since the 1920s. They lost control of both houses of Congress for the first time in 40 years. In the second half of his first term, Clinton was able to rebuild his personal image, and so won re-election in 1996. But never again during Clinton's term were the Democrats to win either house of Congress. A new Republican congressional majority had been created. Clinton was the first Democratic president to be re-elected in 60 years and the only Democratic president to avoid large six year itch losses in his second midterm election. But that was little solace to a Democratic party that saw Republicans hold on to control of both houses of Congress for consecutive terms for the first time in nearly 70 years.
These Republican congressional majorities had a lasting effect on the ideological positioning of the Clinton administration. For the rest of his term, Clinton stuck tightly to the political center. Although Clinton won the public relations battle in bitter budget fights with the new Republican Congress, he was forced to accept substantive budget and policy compromises. The highly visible welfare reform bill of 1996 reflected more the Republican emphasis on cutting benefits rather than the Democratic emphasis on providing more training and counseling to those who had historically had little success in the job market.
Midterm Elections and the Pull to the Center in the Reagan Years
When the Reagan administration first came to power, it sought to strike while the iron was hot and reverse what it perceived as the liberal domination of public policy-making. Reagan's first budget represented the most dramatic shifting of taxing and spending policies since the passage of Great Society legislation by LBJ in 1965. The Reagan landslide of 1980 had a significant impact on party strength in Congress. The Republicans picked up 12 Senate seats to gain control of the chamber for the first time since 1954. The Democrats maintained control of the House, but the Republicans gained 35 seats. These gains enabled them to form a coalition with conservative southern Democrats to pass Reagan's economic and budgetary policies in 1981.
But in the 1982 elections the Republicans lost 24 House seats. The conservative ideological majority evaporated as the Democrats regained effective control of the House of Representatives. From that point on, Reagan was forced to compromise with the Democratic leadership in the House in order to pass legislation. The pull to the center had begun. On such key issues as taxes and Social Security reform, the Reagan administration ended up endorsing compromises that were inconsistent with its conservative ideology.
In the 1986 congressional elections the Republicans lost nine Senate seats, and control of the Senate returned to the Democrats. The centrist pressures on the administration gained even greater momentum. At this point Reagan made even more dramatic reversals in foreign policy, particularly in negotiating a new arms control agreement with the Soviets.
The Two Year Itch and Carter's Ideological Repositioning
Even though Jimmy Carter was one of the less ideologically consistent presidents, the midterm election of 1978 had a distinct impact on his administration. Throughout his term Carter tried to downplay ideology in order to keep his administration from being identified with the polar ideological wing of his party. Carter was widely criticized during his term for indecisiveness and flip-flopping on issues, taking one position at one time and an opposing one at a later time. Even so, the ideological stance of the Carter administration was affected significantly by a midterm election.
The perception of ideological inconsistency began early in his term when, as part of his first budget, Carter proposed a tax rebate to stimulate the economy, then a few months later withdrew the proposal as inflationary. A similar flip-flop occurred in arms control policy when the administration first proposed a set of innovative proposals to move beyond the cautious SALT I framework of the Nixon-Ford years, then quickly abandoned it when the Soviets balked. But even within this context a clear shift in the ideological stance of the administration can be identified.
In its early years the Carter administration had an ambivalent relationship with the traditional Democratic leadership and the policies they represented. On the one hand, Carter sometimes seemed to go out of his way to step on the toes of old-line Democrats. Perhaps the most politically damaging of such actions was his attempt to cut back on the water projects that were the kind of traditional constituency-pleasing pork barrel on which Democratic members of Congress had historically built their political support.
Yet Carter's policy positions on a number of key issues did represent an attempt to find a middle way between the old New Deal Democrats and the new generation of post-Vietnam, neoliberal Democrats. Although Carter was averse to costly new social initiatives, some programs were expanded. The CETA public jobs program grew considerably under his tenure. Social Security finances were bolstered by a tax increase to keep pace with benefits. Maternal and child health and nutrition programs were expanded. In foreign policy Carter sought to continue and even accelerate detente with the Soviet Union.
However, after the Democratic Party suffered significant losses in the midterm elections of 1978, Carter consciously sought to widen the distance between his administration and the liberal wing of his party. Democratic majorities in Congress had swelled in 1974 and 1976 in the wake of the Republicans' Watergate scandals. But in 1978 the pendulum swung the other way, and the Democrats lost 16 House and 3 Senate seats. It was no accident that major personnel changes followed in 1979.
After retreating to Camp David, Carter sacked several of the leading liberals in the administration, the most prominent being Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph Califano, who had been closely identified with Johnson's Great Society and with Senator Ted Kennedy. In the foreign policy field hard-liners like National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and former Nixon-Ford cabinet member James Schlessinger took more prominent roles as the more liberal Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had his role downgraded and was eventually forced out.
