The American Ideological Spectrum: Foreign Policy Doctrines from the Cold War to the 21st Century

FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR
Cold War Foreign Policy Ideologies
Reagan on the National Security Ideology
Goldwater on Holy War
Hegemonic Engagement in the Inaugural Address of John Kennedy
Nixon on World Peace
Characterizing Ideologies on Issues of International Trade
FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGIES IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA
Parellels between Cold War and Post Cold War Foreign Policy Ideologies
Foreign Policy Ideologies in the 21st Century

While the American ideological spectrum on political economic issues has remained relatively stable since the New Deal, ideologies about foreign policy have been more dynamic, reflecting the rapid changes in the international system in the 20th century.  In a later chapter I will deal with American foreign policy ideologies in the first half of the 20th century.  In this chapter I describe the range of ideological debate during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era, and show the continuities and changes in ideas about American foreign policy in these two periods.

FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR

While the philosophy of isolationism was vanquished by World War II, the cold war brought new forms of debate over the appropriate role for the United States in the world. Later chapters will analyze the emergence and development of ideologies in the cold war era. This chapter will simply introduce a fourfold typology, shown below, that clarifies the ideas which animated the foreign policies of presidents during the cold war.

Cold War Foreign Policy Ideologies
 

PEACE MOVEMENT

HEGEMONIC ENGAGEMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

HOLY  WAR

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The cold war brought a broad agreement about the general goals of U.S. foreign policy, what was called the bipartisan consensus. But debate over the place of ideals and morality in foreign policy was not over. The more centrist foreign policy ideologies stressed realism in the pursuit of national power. But both the ideological left and the right challenged the morality of the dominant centrist ideologies, although on different grounds.

The National Security State

The national security ideology was the dominant force in U.S. foreign policy from the end of World War II through the 1960s. It still plays a prominent role in shaping foreign policy today. The national security state's conception of the U.S. role in the world was shaped primarily by anticommunism. Communist expansion was seen as the principal threat to world peace in the latter twentieth century.

U.S. power was believed to be the only force that could check worldwide Soviet military and ideological power. The basic currency of international power was defined as military force. The Soviet military was seen as the heart of communist power, and the U.S. military was the prime means of opposing the communist threat.

In the national security state, all other elements of foreign policy were subordinated to the struggle against communism and the maintenance of a favorable military balance. The national security state extended U.S. military power through a series of alliances stretching from western Europe to the Pacific Rim. Cemented by trade and cultural relations, these alliances were seen as critical in the world military balance, and thus considerable energy was put into maintaining them.

Anticommunism and military force were also central in the way the national security state approached the Third World. The doctrine of counterinsurgency justified support for anticommunist regimes and movements. By backing anticommunist governments and supporting rebels against socialist governments the United States could sometimes achieve its objectives without directly risking American lives or prestige. So over the years the United States armed and trained forces of the governments of the Shah of Iran; Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines; Central American military governments such as those El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; and for a time the government in South Vietnam. The United States also supported rebels trying to overthrow socialist regimes in Nicaragua, Cuba, Guatemala, Chile, Iran, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere.

The distinction between totalitarian (read pro-Soviet) and authoritarian (read pro-U.S. or neutral) regimes was used by the national security ideology to justify support for pro-U.S. dictatorships as well as aid to rebels fighting against regimes too friendly with Moscow. When U.S. interests or pro-U.S. regimes were threatened, the national security state called for political stability. But if a socialist regime showed any sign of weakness, the counterinsurgency was prescribed to destabilize it.

The national security ideology dominated U.S. foreign policymaking from the end of World War II through the 1960s. It has shaped the behavior of every president since Truman, Democrat and Republican alike. One of the clearest statements of the national security ideology can be found in the 1980 Republican Party platform.

The premier challenge facing the United States, its allies, and the entire globe is to check the Soviet Union's global ambitions. This challenge must be met, for the present danger is greater than ever before. . . . The Soviet Union is accelerating its drive for military superiority and is intensifying its military pressure and ideological combat against the industrial democracies and the vulnerable developing nations. The scope and magnitude of the growth of Soviet military power threatens American interests at every level, from the nuclear threat to our survival, to our ability to protect the lives and property of Americans abroad.

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The platform concluded that the United States needed to embark on a military buildup and to be more willing to use its military power to contain Soviet expansion. This was the essence of the national security ideology.

The Holy War Ideology

The more idealistic holy war ideology shared with the national security state a central concern with the power of communism. But the differences in degree were so great as to make a real difference in kind. The holy war ideology viewed the atheistic Soviet Union as "the evil empire," as "the focus of all evil in the modern world." From this perspective, since communism was totally and incorrigibly evil, the only response of the forces of righteousness was to struggle at all costs until righteousness prevailed. For the righteous, there could be no compromise with the devil, only eternal enmity.

In contrast, while the rhetoric of the national security state often utilized this demonic image of the Soviet Union to mobilize Americans to particular conflicts with socialist forces, at its core it was a more realist philosophy. The national security state tended to see the Soviet Union as the primary opponent of the United States in a great power rivalry. The differences between the idealism of the holy war ideology and the realism of the national security ideology led to significant policy differences. While the national security state used sophisticated strategies to amass a broad range of allies in its anticommunist goals, the holy war state demanded adherence to its ideological doctrines and tended to view any force that did not agree with those doctrines as an inherent enemy. The national security state was cautious and reluctant to deal directly with the Soviets on issues of joint concern like nuclear weapons, but even such a tough-minded anticommunist realist as Richard Nixon negotiated an opening to China and an arms treaty with the Russians. However, the holy war state was unwilling to countenance any bargaining with the devil.

Barry Goldwater was one prominent conservative spokesman who called for holy war against the Soviet Union. In the book he released as he prepared to run for president, Why Not Victory?, Goldwater articulated themes he used repeatedly as the Republican presidential nominee in 1964.

This is a conflict where one side or the other must win. . . . On this question the decision is out of our hands. The rules for the conflict have been laid down by the Soviet Union. . . . We have continued to delude ourselves with something called peaceful coexistence while communism has kept right on gobbling up one country after another.

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Before he became president and in the early years of his administration, Ronald Reagan at times seemed to call for holy war against communism. In his presidential campaigns in 1968, 1976, and 1980, Reagan had scorned all the major agreements negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union as sellouts to communism. In Reagan's first term as president, arms control negotiations with the Soviets were broken off as the United States launched the largest peacetime military buildup in its history. With the emergence of the Gorbachev reforms in the Soviet Union, Reagan reversed his position toward the Soviets in his second term. But in his first term, a holy war mentality prevailed.

Hegemonic Engagement

A more centrist opposition to the national security state came from those who advocated that the United States adopt the posture of a flexible hegemon. A hegemon is a dominant power in a global system, a nation strong enough to influence the shape of the world system itself. Great Britain was such a power in the period from the Napoleonic wars up until World War I. At the end of World War II, the United States was in such a position. As the only power whose homeland was untouched by the war, the United States was able to shape the character of the postwar world. It was the leading economic, military, and political power, and it used its influence to construct an alliance of capitalist powers in Europe and Japan while building a series of global economic institutions that survive today, even as U.S. power is in decline.

Like the national security ideology, the ideology of hegemonic engagement was based on maintaining American power and leadership in world affairs. Like both the national security and holy war ideologies, the strategy of the flexible hegemon was premised on checking the power of communism, relying heavily on maintaining U.S. military capabilities. But the flexible hegemonic position rested on more than military force or even anticommunism. This ideology was more confident of the ability of the United States to influence world events through means other than military power—diplomatic, economic, trade, and technological leadership all also played a major role in the foreign policy of an flexible hegemon.

Hegemonic engagement mixed elements of idealism with realism. It argued that moral values were part of America's strength as a world power. U.S. foreign policy needed to express America's special mission, which was crucial to animating the alliances it developed and to justifying its power in the eyes of the world. In this strategy, bargaining and negotiation played as important a role as naked force. Integration of the U.S. economy with its trading partners in western Europe and the Pacific Rim was seen as just as important as maintenance of the military preparedness of the alliances. Conflicts with Third World regimes were thought to be as susceptible to political negotiation as to counterinsurgency. Even conflict with the Soviet Union could be managed through arms control agreements, bargaining over the use of forces, and ultimately through widened trade and cultural relations. It was this differing emphasis on the various tools of foreign policy that distinguished the flexible hegemon from the national security state.

Hegemonic Engagement in the Inaugural Address of John Kennedy Global Role: Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty. The Western Alliance: To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Aid to Anticommunists in the Third World: To our sister republics south of our border, we offer . . . a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. Peaceful Coexistence with Communism: To . . . our adversary, we . . . request that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction. . . . We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed. But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort in our present course. . . . Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

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Opponents on the right often accused the advocates of hegemonic engagement of replacing faith in military power with faith in diplomacy, of being overly idealistic and unrealistic about the role of power in world politics. It is true that the ideology of hegemonic engagement invoked certain ideals, such as human rights and international law, more often than the national security ideology. But the real aim of this philosophy was to maintain the U.S. position as a hegemonic power. Hegemonic engagement supplemented realistic pursuit of national power with idealistic justifications for that power. An appropriate image for this strategy would be the national symbol of the eagle carrying weapons in one claw and an olive branch in the other. Some of the concepts of hegemonic engagement emerged in the administration of John Kennedy, although this philosophy did not really flourish until the administrations of Nixon, Ford, and Carter in the 1970s.

The Peace Movement

Even at the height of its dominance of U.S. foreign policy-making, the cold war was not without its fundamental critics. Throughout the cold war there were those in the U.S. political system who argued that the cold war was not necessary or desirable. This ideological tendency can perhaps best be described as the peace movement.

The peace movement rejected the basic premises of the cold war. It argued that there was no reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to be locked into positions of interminable hostility, and resisted defining every conflict in the world in terms of East-West struggle. America's assumption of a global military role was contested, as was the growing reliance of U.S. military planners on nuclear weapons. Instead, the peace movement called for fundamental transformation of the cold war world system, asserting that there were grounds for cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The peace movement sought an end to the military confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Union in Europe and the eventual demilitarization of central Europe. It argued for arms control agreements that went beyond simply reshaping the direction of the arms race and that so sharply reduced nuclear arsenals as to end the threat of nuclear holocaust for Americans, Soviets, and the peoples of the world. The peace movement also sought to end the extension of U.S.-Soviet conflict into the Third World and to stop the superpowers from arming Third World allies and fanning the flames of local conflicts. Conflicts in the Third World were viewed as driven primarily by local issues rather than by Soviet manipulation. The peace movement believed that the world would be a safer place if military forces, and particularly nuclear weapons, could be reduced rather than continually built up. It argued world hunger, economic development, and global ecology deserved more attention than competition between the superpowers.

While the peace movement shared some surface similarities with the strategy of the flexible hegemon, it was much more idealistic. While the hegemonic position mixed realistic concern about national power with idealism about the ends of power, the peace movement was more acutely aware of the contradictions between the professed ideals of U.S. foreign policy and the pursuit of power. The peace movement differed fundamentally from any ideology of hegemony in its ultimate view about U.S. power. A flexible hegemon may apply many tools to achieve its ends, including appeals to moral principles, but its fundamental end is to retain its hegemonic position. In contrast, many in the peace movement saw a retrenchment, and eventually a rollback, of U.S. power and military commitments as not only inevitable, but also, in many ways, desirable. They sought a world in which a U.S. role as global policeman would become obsolete.

All presidents at one time or another gave voice to the sentiments expressed by the peace movement. Even that old cold warrior Richard Nixon, under the pressure of the withdrawal from Vietnam, and highlighting the signing of the SALT agreement and the opening to China, reflected some of the philosophy of the peace movement in his second inaugural address in 1973.

The peace we seek in the world is not the flimsy peace which is merely an interlude between wars, but a peace which can endure for generations to come. . . . Let us build a structure of peace in the world in which the weak are as safe as the strong—in which each respects the right of the other to live by a different system—in which those who would influence others will do so by the strength of their ideas, and not by the force of arms.

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However, in the period from the late 1940s through the late 1980s, no president gave the premises of the peace movement priority over the premises of the cold war. From Truman through Ronald Reagan the United States remained locked in conflict with the Soviet Union. While the doctrine of peaceful coexistence that emerged in the 1960s moderated the competition, the United States and the Soviet Union remained enemies. While arms control agreements affected weapons systems at the margins, every year of the cold war left the world with more armaments and greater destructive power than before. Pro-U.S. and pro-Soviet proxy forces clashed in every region of the globe.

Characterizing Ideologies on Issues of International Tradereturn to top

The foregoing typology is best suited for the more traditional foreign policy issues of international security. It helps in understanding how different administrations have dealt with topics like the Soviet Union, deployment of military forces, arms control, NATO, and emerging political forces in the Third World. It is less helpful in understanding how presidents dealt with the newly pressing issue of the 1980s and 1990s—the trade deficit and the U.S. position in the world economy.

Trade has always been an important issue of public policy. In the nineteenth century the high tariffs the less economically developed United States placed on European manufactures to protect domestic industry were one of the most consistently contentious political issues. Rural consumers fought bitterly, but largely in vain, to break down these barriers and thus lower prices. But by the end of World War II the situation had changed entirely. Now the United States was the dominant manufacturing power in the world and sought open world markets for its cheap industrial goods. Throughout most of the postwar period the United States ran a significant trade surplus. The principal objective of trade policy was seen as opening international markets so superior U.S. corporations could operate. In the 1980s, however, foreign penetration of the U.S. market far outstripped U.S. exports. In recent years the United States has run trade deficits of over $100 billion. Suddenly many U.S. policy-makers have sounded like Third World leaders complaining about foreign domination of their markets.

It is notable that in the face of this international challenge, American politicians have dealt with the trade issue much as if it were an issue of domestic economic policy. On the right, the philosophical approach has been free trade. Free traders argue that international markets should be allowed to operate without government interference such as tariffs or other trade barriers. If the government has any role in this area, it should be to point out to other nations the benefits of further opening their markets to international trade. This is essentially a laissez-faire approach to international trade.

On the other hand, there are those who argue that U.S. workers and businesses should be protected from the vagaries of international markets. They argue that unregulated markets do not necessarily serve the national interest, asserting that the playing field is not level, that other nations use trade barriers, or subsidies, or low-wage labor to take unfair advantage of the American worker. Therefore, as in domestic policy, it is the responsibility of the government to protect the interests of those who are harmed by unregulated markets. In domestic policy, I have called this the social security philosophy. On the left, the argument goes beyond simply regulating markets. Jesse Jackson, for example, has emphasized how U.S. corporations have reaped large profits from investing abroad, where labor is cheap. He refers to this as "exporting jobs" and "purging American workers." The social democratic philosophy argues that the interests of the multinational corporation and the American worker are in conflict. According to social democrats, only by giving workers a voice in how profits are reinvested and by using government to restrict the investment of American capital in low-wage countries will the interest of ordinary Americans really be protected.

Public policy in the 1980s steered a course between pure laissez-faire and the social security philosophy. Ronald Reagan gave strong rhetorical support to the free market philosophy. But Reagan also took some protectionist actions, most notably against Japanese computer chips when they threatened high-tech, military-related industries and against Japanese autos. So the outcome of trade policy at this point can best be described as fitting the pattern of the limited interest state. Some of the most strategic and politically well-organized interests get protection. Yet government aid is not universal but is limited in the number and scope of interests it assists.
 

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The typologies of ideology presented in this book are not meant to be timeless categories of thought but characterizations of the ideas that shaped policy-making in particular historical periods. The concepts that shaped U.S. foreign policy during the cold war are inadequate to characterize either the massive changes in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union or the U.S. policy response to these changes. The cold war was central to virtually every foreign policy issue for nearly half a century, and thus served to simplify policy debate. The issues were tough, but the framework was largely unidimensional.

However, despite the new issues of the 21st century, old habits of thought die hard.  There are parallels between the shape of ideological debate during the Cold War and the terms of foreign policy discourse today, which are summarized in the graphic below.  The American political center is still focused on maintaining American power around the world.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, American hegemony is not seriously threatened by any state or alliance system or global political movement.  But differences remain between liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, etc.  On the right-center the emphasis is still put on building a strong military and using that military against American enemies around the globe.  The left-center is also committed to a strong military and the use of that military, but is more likely to supplement the possession and use of military force with economic and diplomatic tools of foreign policy.  The left-center is more likely to engage potential enemies and try to draw them into the international system led by the U.S.  Thus I have labeled this tendency, Inclusive Hegemony.  The right-center is more likely to distrust non-western nations and international institutions and thus more ready to define many non-western nations as "outside" the hegemonic system, as "rogue" states, international outlaws, or strategic competitiors.  Thus I have called this tendency Excluive Hegemony.  Further out on the right, this distrust of foreigners, freed from the burden of defeating godless communism, becomes a 21st version of isolationism.  The new right rejects the very international and multinational institutions that make American hegemony possible and wants to keep the U.S. pristine from the corruption of foreign ideas and cultures.  This ideology I have named America First Unilateralism.  The contemporary left is often charactierized in the mainstream media as "anti-globalization," but that is not really accurate.  The new left is anti-transnational corporation (TNC) and anti-TNC domination of the globalization process.  In fact the new left has its own agenda for globalization--a globalization that does not serve the interests of the rich and powerful in the West but spreads more equitably the benefits of international cooperation.  Thus I have called this way of thinking the New Global Agenda.

Parellels between Cold War and Post Cold War Foreign Policy Ideologies

Old Spectrum
Peace Movement	Hegemonic Engagement	National Security State	Holy War
New Spectrum
New Global Agenda	Inclusive Hegemony	Exclusive Hegemony	America First Unilateralism

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Inclusive vs. Exclusive Hegemony

The Soviet Union is gone, and with it the principle justification of American foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century.  In the past decade new differences have emerged between the center-left (the center of the Democratic party) and the center-right (the center of the Republican party) of American foreign policy makers.  At the core, both parties and almost the entire foreign policy elite support American hegemony and policies necessary to maintain it.  In that sense, the center of the American ideological spectrum finds its origins in Woodrow Wilson's ideas about the U.S. playing a new and special role in the international system.  But fundamental differences in perceptions of the external world that were characteristic of the center-left and center-right during the cold war remain to shape policy in the post-cold war world.  The center-right still retains a touch of Teddy Roosevelt's greater faith in the use of military power and lesser faith in the ability of non-western nations to reform themselves without forceful intervention from the West.

Perhaps the most elemental difference in mainstream thought is the degree to which the external world is adapting itself to American hegemony.  The center-right, like during the cold war, sees much more threat to American interests and American power, a world as full of hostile nations and forces as it is of friends of the U.S.  The center-left, again like during the cold war, sees American power as dominant and the forces arrayed against U.S. interests as relatively weak and increasingly historically irrelevant.  Both the center-right and the center-left tend to believe that the world is being transformed into a global neoliberal system.  But they disagree on the pace at which that is happening and the degree to which dangerous threats to the U.S. and the global system remain.

The center-left tends to see the American-led global system as increasingly all-embracing.  The center-left is confident that much of the remaining opposition to American hegemony can be incorporated into the global system via diplomacy and positive incentives, by policies the Clinton administration called engagement.  Thus I have labeled this ideological tendency Inclusive Hegemony.  But the center-right remains focused on threats to American interests and isolating and at times militarily attacking the sources of those threats.  The center-right is ultimately more confident of American power now that the Soviet Union has been defeated, but they still see multiple military and political threats that must be excised if American hegemony is to continue to prevail.  Thus I have labeled this ideological tendency Exclusive Hegemony.

Both centrist tendencies think the basic purpose of American foreign policy is to expand American power and hegemony.  But Exclusive Hegemony is more focused on defending the West from external enemies and on the possession and use of American military power as the key tool of foreign policy.  Exclusive Hegemony continues to support the institutions of the National Security State even though the cold war is over because it continues to view the world largely through the lens of threats to American power, particularly military threats, and this is what the institutions of the National Security State were contructed to combat.  In contrast, Inclusive Hegemony sees military power as only one element of U.S. foreign policy because it is more confident in diplomacy and political means in a world that is already largely accommodating itself to American power and becoming increasingly liberalized.  So for example, the Clinton administration often intervened diplomatically and politically as well as militarily in conflicts from Somalia to Haiti to the Balkans, often taking a key role in peacekeeping missions of the United Nations.  But Republicans in the Senate and Republican presidential candidates severely criticized these interventions because they were focused on political tranformation rather than simple military victory, and especially because they were conducted through the United Nations rather than solely by the U.S. military.

Foreign Policy Ideologies in the 21st Century
 

	New Global Agenda	Inclusive Hegemony	Exclusive Hegemony	America First Unilateralism
view of the non-western world	oppressed by American hegemony + transnational corporation	mostly benign + transforming itself into American image	partly hostlie +  partly benign + slowly transforming itself into American image	fundamentally different + hostile to U.S. and West
basic purpose of American policy	should be to seek global peace, justice + human rights	to expand American power + to transform the world in U.S. image	to expand American power + defend the West	to isolate the U.S. from unwanted foreign influence
role of military power	should be deemphasized in American policy	one key element of American power	most important element of American power	only reliable element of American power
role of diplomacy	should be most important element of American policy	one key element of American power	less important than military power, mostly used to support U.S. military + economic power	fundamental distrust of any agreements with foreign powers
reasons for use of military power	use of U.S.  military power rarely justified	to provide global or regional stability	to defeat enemies of American power + to provide stability	to defend the continental U.S. + key trade routes
preferred form of intervention	economic	political + economic, military if necessary	military + political/economic  to support military	military but only to protect U.S. citizens or corporations
attitude toward the national security state	oppose	support but supplement w/ other tools	strongly support	support in North American but oppose most global operations
purpose of the Western Alliance	should be to seek global peace, justice + human rights	partners in transforming the world in Western image	support U.S. policy + partners in common defense	share common values + sometimes coordinate policies
reasons for moral superiority of West	the West is not morally superior	democracy + capitalism are superior systems	democracy + capitalism are superior systems	West is white + Christian  + democracy + capitalism are superior systems
role of international institutions	should be to mitigate and oppose power of the TNCs	to support U.S. foreign policy + to spread democracy + capitalism	to support U.S. military action + other foreign policies	oppose existence of most  international institutions
policy toward China + Russia	incorporate into global system + seek their support for new global agenda	engage in order to transform into Western image	defend against their military power + negotiate on specifc issues	isolate them + wait for their collapse
foreign economic policy	should be to fight global poverty	expand U.S. access to foreign markets + sometimes protect U.S. companies, workers, + environment	expand U.S. access to foreign markets	protect U.S. market + expand U.S. access to foreign markets
image of transnational corporation	the enemy of global justice	engine of global transformation but sometimes needs regulation	engine of global growth + transformation	good if U.S. controlled but bad if not
reasons for economic sanctions	to support human rights + social justice	to support global stability + to punish enemies of the U.S. + to support human rights	to punish enemies of the U.S. + to isolate non-capitalist regimes	to express U.S. moral superiority + to keep foreign goods + foreign ideas out of the U.S.
role of arms control	crucial to world peace	important to peace + global stability	sometimes useful to disarm enemies	foreign trick to disarm the U.S.

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Similarly, the Clinton administration was deeply involved in intensive negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians and in talks with North Korea over political solutions to North Korean weapons programs and issues on the Korean peninsula.  But at least in its first year in office, the Bush administration has had no discussions with North Korea.  While the Bush administration has been involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Bush himself has yet to meet with the Palestinians and his government has increasingly isolated the Palestinians rather than trying, as the Clinton administration did, to incorporate them into an ongoing dialog and evntual structure of peace.

Similarities and differences in emphasis also apply to the Western alliance.  Both hegemonic tendencies see the West as morally superior to the rest of the world because its is capitalist and democratic.  Both tendencies see the Europeans as indispensible partners in the American-led global system.  However Exclusive Hegemony emphasizes joint military action and preparation, while Inclusive Hegemony has a broader agenda for the Western alliance, as partners in many dimensions of the transformation of non-western nations and their deeper incorporation into the global neoliberal system.

Both forms of hegemonism see international institutions as potentially helpful in expanding the global neoliberal order, but Exclusive Hegemonism is more suspicious of the motives and capabilities of international institutions.  While Inclusive Hegemonism is confident that the U.S. and the West can control the agenda of international institutions, Exclusive Hegemonism is more likely to see the objectives of international institutions at least partially in conflict with the neoliberal agenda.  Exclusive Hegemonism is more likely to want to limit international institutions to supporting American-led military action.  Thus Republican Senators have held up U.S. dues to the UN in order to pressure it to follow more closely the U.S. international agenda.  Republican Senators and presidential candidates have strongly resisted the U.S. participating in any UN peacekeeping missions unless the U.S. has direct command over all the forces.  Republicans have been more critical of the IMF and more willing to let non-liberalized economies fail rather than be bailed out by the IMF.

Similarly, there are subtle differences in the two camps over how to deal with China and Russia.  The Clinton administration actively pursued engagement with both former cold war enemies, confident that they could be enticed into greater participation in the global neoliberal order and thus incrementally reformed and eventually transformed into liberal societies.  Exclusive hegemonism has the same long term goal, but is less sanguine about the current regimes in both China and Russia.  The new Bush administration has abandoned more than the term "engagement," it has taken a tougher line toward both nations.  Many in the new Bush administration subscribe to the "China threat" school, which sees China emerging as the eventual challenger to U.S. hegemony and thus seeks to thwart the growth of Chinese power.  The new Bush administration has also abandoned a generation of arms control by scrapping the most central component of the arms control regime--the ABM Treaty, over objections not only of the Russians but also almost all of its European allies.  Inclusive Hegemonism sees arms control as crucial to the prevention of nuclear war, while Exclusive Hegemonism does not.  Exclusive Hegemonism prefers to rely on U.S. military superiority to deter war, and sees arms control primarily as a means of codifying U.S. military superiority.

On foreign ecnomic policy there are also many similarities and some differences.  Both forms of hegemonism celebrate the global transnational corporation (TNC) and see it as the engine of transformation of the rest of the world into the American image.  Both forms of hegemonism seek to open new markets around the world to western-based TNCs.  Inclusive Hegemonism is more likely to seek some national and international regulation of the TNCs to protect national markets, jobs and workers' rights to organize, and the environment, while Exclusive Hegemonism resists such regulation at both the national and international level.  Both forms of hegemonism use economic sanctions as a tool of U.S. policy, but sometimes in different circumstances.  Exclusive Hegemonism is more likely to support economic sanctions to punish nations that it identifies as enemies, while Inclusive Hegemonism is more likely to support economic sanctions to support international agreements which seek to enforce regional stability or human rights.  Thus Republicans are more likely to support economic sanctions against socialist nations such as China, Cuba, and Vietnam, while Democrats are more likely to support economic sanctions against nations such as Indonesia, which have undermined regional stability and human rights in their attempts to control East Timor, or such as Burma, which systematically violates international standards of human rights.  Both forms of hegemonism tend to support economic sanctions against Iraq, but their justifications for sanctions tend to be different.  Republicans tend to simply identify Iraq as an enemy of the U.S., while Democrats are more likely to stress Iraq's violation of international agreements and the political rights of ethnic minorities.

America First Unilateralism

The dominant political forces in the U.S. support American hegemony, but there are ideological tendencies on both the right and left which do not.  At the right pole of the American spectrum is a tendency of thought which rejects the burdens of American hegemony in favor of a unilateralist foreign policy.  While the center of the Republican party tends to view a significant fraction of the world as hostile to American power and interests, the Republican right tends to view most of the world as not only implacably opposed to American power and interests, but essentially unredeemable by the global neoliberal order.  This right view harkens back to the Isolationism of the 19th century, seeking to insulate the U.S. from unwanted foreign influence and the heavy burdens of American global leadership.

America First Unilateralism views the external world as dangerous and believes that only American military power can be trusted to defend American interests in this hostile world.  American interests are not found in international institutions and agreements, but are essentially seen as maintenance of American national sovereignty and protection of trade routes which are indispensible to American prosperity.  Foreigners are seen as inherently untrustworthy and thus diplomacy and international agreements are unreliable elements of American foreign policy.  In this view international institutions and agreements are driven by forces antagonistic to American interests.  Arms control agreements with potential enemies are particularly suspect as foreign tricks to disarm the U.S.  Communist and foremerly communist nations such as China and Russia should not be trusted, but rather isolated so that their non-western ideas and practices cannot infect the U.S. and the West.

But even democratic, capitalist European nations are seen as unduly influenced by socialism and competing national agendas and thus not truly reliable allies.  American First Unilateralism places great emphasis on the shared values of the West, not only democracy and capitalism, but also Christianity and white racial roots.  But it tends to view the governments of Europe as not as fully committed to these values as the U.S., and under the undue influence of secular and even socialist values.  So America First Unilateralism opposes not just the policies but the very existence of broadly international institutions like the UN , the WTO, and the IMF.  It also opposes many of the international agreements between western powers, for example the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Opposition to NAFTA reflects the sense on the right that the nation state is more fundamental to identity than the transnational corporation.  On the right, TNCs are supported when their agenda favors the U.S. citizenry, but opposed when they reflect a more broad global agenda.

A New Global Agenda

The new left is often portrayed in the media as anti-globalization, but that characterization is a media simplification, perpetuated by centrist forces which want to portray the left as swimming against the historical tide.  A more accurate analysis would be that the new left is opposed to the current form of globalization dominated by American hegemony and the transnational corporation TNC.  The left views American hegemony and the TNC as oppressive forces in the non-western world, forces that despite their rhetoric are usually opposed to global peace, justice for all, and the realization of human rights.  They do not see the U.S. or the West as morally superior to the non-western world, but often on the wrong side of issues like global trade, economic development in the non-western world, the environment, arms control, etc.  To the left the TNC and the international financial system are not engines of economic prosperity but ways of extracting wealth and resources from less developed nations and further enriching the wealthy in the U.S. and the West.  The left feels that the U.S. policy favors the TNC and American power over the interests of the less developed nations and even the American worker and American citizens.  For example, on the issue of debt relief for the poorest nations of the world, the left sees American policy as siding with the U.S. and western banks against the interests of the poor.  On the left, the IMF is seen not as a truly international institution, but as the collection agency for western banks, using financial crises engendered by western penetration of non-western economies as an opportunity to extract more wealth from poorer nations at the expense of the living standards of the poor of the world.

The new left sees American hegemony as the enforcing agent of the unjust global regime dominated by the TNC.  The left opposes the American national security state as intervening around the world in what are essentially local conflicts, escalating the level of killing often primarily in order to protect American property or American political control.  Within the U.S., the national security state has often been mobilized to suppress movements that challenge the global reach of the U.S. military and the TNC.  The left opposes what it sees as indiscriminate use of American military power around the world, preferring the U.S. rely on diplomacy to achieve its goals.  On arms control, the left sees the U.S. seeking to disarm potential enemies but unwilling to restrain its own vast military machine.  The left is not anti-globalization, but rather seeks a new global order that places peace and social justice above the narrow interests of the TNCs and the American military.

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