AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEIdeological Centrism, Ideological Construction, and Ideological PolarizationThe American ideological system alternates between three basic states: Ideological Centrism, Ideological Construction, and Ideological Polarization. The most common condition is Ideological Centrism. In these periods there is relatively little conflict about ideas and the general direction of public policy. Students of public policy have often commented on the "incremental" nature of American politics. In normal times, policy change tends to come in small steps or increments. Existing policies tend to only be refined at the margins. The Madisonian system of checks and balances makes it hard to gather and sustain the political momentum to make large or rapid changes in public policy. After long periods of ideological centrism it becomes hard for policymakers or academics to even conceive that large scale changes in public policy or in the ideas that guide policy are possible. At the end of one long period of ideological centrism the scholar Daniel Bell wrote his famous work, The End of Ideology. At that time President Kennedy also talked about the end of ideology in economic policy, reflecting the lack of controversy of what had once been a highly contested doctrine of Keynesianism.
Liberal Hegemony under the Roosevelt Realignment, 1933-1948This is not to say that in periods of Ideological Centrism all ideological conflict ceases. Even during such periods there are political forces on the left and right that seek to change the prevailing ideas about public policy and shift policy practice in one consistent direction. But neither the left nor the right can generate the political force to actually move policy in their preferred direction or to change the prevailing notions about policy goals. Politicians generally recognize the relative weakness of both the left and the right and tend to hew to the political center where elections are won and lost. Most practical policymakers eschew new ideas that do not have obvious political support and stict to established goals and practices. Political and ideological conflict does not disappear, but neither the left nor the right can muster the support to change the prevailing public philosophy. Pundits recognize the lack of will for political change and proclaim the triumph of political centrism.The Five Key Periods of Ideological Construction since 1933While periods of Ideological Centrism are most common, there are also clearly times when the prevailing ideas and policies are not adequate to the real challenges the United States faces. Policies often fail, and sometimes they fail spectacularly. At times of policy failure or perceived policy failure, new doctrines rise to meet the new challenges. And at least in certain key periods, new ideas triumph politically and become institutionalized as public policy. Since 1933 there have been at least five such periods of active Ideological Construction, when new ideas prevailed and become institutionalized as a new set of policies.
The Construction of the Welfare State, 1933-1935From World Wars to Global Cold War, 1940-1948
The Construction of the Warfare State, 1940-1945
The Construction of American Hegemony, 1944-1948
The Construction of the National Security State, 1947-1948The Expansion of the Welfare State, 1964-1965
The Construction of Hegemonic Engagement, 1972
The Reagan Restoration, 1981-1982
Ideological Construction comes only in periods of intense political crisis, and only when the will to shift policy in one direction or another can be mobilized by a strong president with clear ideas about what needs to be done. The three major shifts in domestic policy indicated above in red were only possible when presidents enjoyed unusually large partisan blocs in Congress which passed the legislation necessary to institutionalize new domestic policies. The major ideological shifts in foreign policy indicated above in purple stem directly from major wars. The construction of the Warfare State began during World War II, the construction of American Hegemony was the result of winning World War II, and the construction of the National Security State was an outgrowth of both the previous ideologies, adapted to the postwar challenge posed by the Soviet Union. The construction of Hegemonic Engagement was a product of the American defeat in Vietnam, a way of sustaining American Hegemony in the face of that defeat. I will only introduce these periods of Ideological Construction and not describe them in detail here because a large part of this book is devoted to discussing them. These periods are critical in understanding the ideas that have driven American public policy in the last two-thirds of the 20th century.The third possible state of the ideological system is Ideological Polarization, which falls somewhere in between the other two states. Like Ideological Construction, Ideological Polarization appears when there is sustained crisis and perception of failure of the prevailing ideas to successfully guide public policy. But unlike during periods of Ideological Construction, in periods of Ideological Polarization, it is not politically possible to establish and institutionalize new ideas because there is intense conflict between left and right over how to cope with the crisis. In that sense, periods of Ideological Polarization are similar to periods of Ideological Centrism, in that the relative power of the left and right is so closely balanced that neither can win a decisive victory and establish their ideas as new policy doctrine. But during periods of Ideological Polarization the previously agreed upon political center falters as some political forces abandon the center for a more self-consciously right wing position, while other political forces stake out a more self-consciously left wing position. There is intensified conflict over ideas but little institutionalization of new ideas because opposing ideas are contesting for recognition.
Ideological Eras: 1933-2000
The policy dynamics of the U.S. from 1933 to the end of the century can be broken down into different ideological eras, depending on whether Ideological Centrism, Ideological Construction, or Ideological Polarization was the dominant tendency.
Ideological Eras: 1933-2000 Ideological Construction in the Roosevelt-Truman Era, 1933-1948
The Era of Ideological Centrism, 1949-1963
New Ideological Construction and Intensified Ideological Polarization, 1964-1980
The Reagan Restoration, 1981-82
The Reassertion of Ideological Centrism, 1983-2000
The first period of Ideological Construction in this time frame begins with the election of FDR and the New Deal response to the Great Depression. Domestic policymaking returned to more centrist dynamics in 1937 with the defeat of FDR's attempt to gain control of the Supreme Court, but world war brought a new burst of ideological construction during and after the war. By 1948 American hegemony and the National Security State had been institutionalized. The U.S. began a long era of ideological centrism in which neither the basic precepts of the Cold War nor the basic structure of the domestic political economy that had emerged in the 30s and 40s was under serious challenge.Liberalism vs. Conservatism: 1933-2000The postwar centrist consensus began to break down and the political system began to polarize with the emergence of the civil rights movement. The passage of civil rights legislation and the expansion of the welfare state in the mid 1960s marked a new period of ideological construction. But the large temporary majorities in favor of civil rights and new programs in 1964 and 1965 quickly broke down as conservative forces also mobilized to contest further expansion of the welfare state and the more race-conscious policies of the era. Polarization intensified when dissent to the Vietnam War increased. To minimize the impact of the American defeat in Vietnam and to adjust Cold War doctrines to realities of nuclear terror, Richard Nixon led the construction of a new form of American hegemony which I have labelled Hegemonic Engagement, although although the term detente was more commonly used at that time. Hegemonic Engagement also proved controversial and conservative resistance to this doctrine also contributed to further ideological polarization.
The degree of ideological polarization in this period can be seen by the proliferation of presidential candidates who raised serious ideological challenges to the political center. Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee in 1964, George Wallace, an independent southern Democrat who won 13% of the national vote and 5 states' electoral votes in 1968, Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy, serious contenders for the Democratic nomination in 1968, George McGovern, the Democratic nominee in 1972, and Ronald Reagan, almost nominated by the Republicans in 1976, all in one way or another rejected the prevailing policy wisdom of the time. All these candidates were defeated either at their party's convention or in the general election. But at no time in modern American history had so many candidates who challenged so seriously prevailing policy doctrines gained so much popular support. In 1964-65 new ideas about race and social policy were institutionalized, and in the early 1970s new ideas about engaging the Soviet Union and China were also successfully institutionalized. But overall, 1964-1980 was an unusual period of sustained Ideological Polarization, reflecting a profound sense of political crisis and policy failure but great dissensus about what to do about it.
In 1980 the most self-consciously ideological president of the 20th century, Ronald Reagan, was elected. Reagan sought to change the entire gamut of policy doctrines in both foreign and domestic policy. In 1981-82 Reagan was successful in creating an conservative ideological majority of Republicans and conservative southern Democrats which enacted a new set of budgetary priorities that had sustained impact on domestic policy. He also launched a "New Cold War," a conscious rejection of the engagement and detente policies of his immediate predecessors. This wholesale rejection of the policy changes of the 1960s and 70s I have labelled the Reagan Restoration.
But the congressional election of 1983 erased Reagan's ideological majority in Congress. In his second term Reagan reversed himself and engaged the Soviet Union in new arms control and other agreements. The inherent centrist tendencies of the American political system reasserted themselves. In the 1960s and 70s the Republican party had moved to the right and the Democratic party had moved to the left. But from 1981-2002 divided government was the rule. Neither party was able to gain control of the presidency and both Houses of Congress at the same time, with the brief exception of 1993-1994. The parties had polarized, but neither was able to work its will on public policy, and incrementalism and centrism once again became the norm. Incrementalism and centrism came under challenge in the period 1994-1996 when Bill Clinton tried to enact a major change in the American health care system, and the Newt Gingrich and the new Republican majority in Congress tried to enact their "Contract with America" and push policy sharply rightward. But the Republicans blocked Clinton's health care plan and Clinton frustrated the new Republican majority in Congress. By 1997 incrementalism and ideological centrism were once again the rule.
Liberalism vs. Conservatism: 1933-2000
This book tries to push beyond conventional conepts of liberalism and conservatism to develop new typologies of public policy that better illuminate the policy choices of the 20th century. Later chapters will offer new concepts to characterize continuities and change in the public philosophy and public policy. But the conventional terminology of liberalism and conservatism is so broadly and deeply infused into the American political mind that in some cases it is impossible to avoid these terms. Examining the ideological power of the terms liberalism and conservatism over the time period of this study sets a context in which concepts which will be introduced later can be better understood.
The chart below characterizes the ideological eras introduced above in terms of liberalism and conservatism. The election of FDR in 1933 realigned the political system and gave the Democratic party huge majorities and control over public policy not seen in generations. The philosophy of FDR and the Democrats eventually came to be called liberalism. The New Deal sailed through Congress, institutionalizing the theory and practice of a newly activist state, engaged in the political economy as never before. Many key elements of the New Deal were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and eventually abandoned by the Democrats. But after his reelection by massive majorities in 1936 FDR tried to gain control of the Supreme Court by increasing the number of Justices. Under the Constitution, FDR would appoint the new Justices and thus put a liberal majority on the court. The defeat of FDR's Supreme Court plan in Congress in 1937 marked the end of liberal hegemony in domestic policy.
Liberal Hegemony in Domestic Policy, 1933-1937
Liberal Hegemony in Foreign Policy, 1933-1948Incremental Liberalism: Presidents and the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1949-1963
The Culmination of Liberalism with the Johnson Ideological Majority, 1964-1965
Ideological Polarization in Domestic Policy, 1966-1980
Ideological Polarization and Hegemonic Engagement in Foreign Policy, 1966-1980The Reagan Restoration, 1981-1982
Incremental Conservatism, 1983-2000
But the growing clouds of war in Europe replaced domestic squabbles as the center of attention of the United States by the late 1930s. During and after the war first FDR and then Truman engaged in the most significant and prolonged period of ideological construction in the 20th century. First FDR created the Warfare State, harnessing the new philosophy of active state invovlement in the political economy established under the New Deal to war production. As the Allies emerged victorious FDR and his successor Truman began the global task of constructing American hegemony. Then as it became apparent the Soviet Union would not acquiesce to the U.S. conception of the postwar world, the Cold War began and the National Security State was created to fight it. Democratic presidents FDR and Truman dominated this process of change in American foreign policy doctrine and thus these policies came to be called liberal.However, just as Truman was engaged in the process of reconstituting American foreign policy doctrine, the Democratic party control of the political system faltered. In the election of 1946 there was a major swing to the Republicans giving them their first majority in Congress since 1933. The Democrats regained control of Congress in 1948 as Truman won an upset victory in the presidential race. But in 1952 the Republicans not only took control of Congress again, but also won the presidency with the war hero Eisenhower. The Democrats retook control of Congress in 1954 and would not lose either house of Congress again for a quarter of a century. But conservative Republicans, in coalition with conservative southern Democrats, had the upper hand in Congress from 1946-1963.
Truman was able to gain bipartisan support for the new Cold War against the Soviet Union and the creation of the National Security State in 1947 and 1948. But after that liberal ideological construction stalled. Liberal ideological hegemony was over. It wasn't so much that liberalism was decisive defeated as that now conservative in Congress held countervailing political power and any new ideological construction by liberals was blocked. An era of Ideological Centrism ensued. In terms of liberalism and conservatism, it could be called an era of Incremental Liberalism. Liberalism still was the predominant public philosophy, but new ideas or policies based on liberal ideals were stymied by the conservative coalition in Congress.
In the late 1950s and the 1960s the civil rights movement arose demanding inclusion of African-Americans in the political system. At first, the conservative coalition in Congress was able to thwart any change in racial policy. But by 1964 most Republicans abandoned their southern Democratic allies and voted for major civil rights legislation. In the 1964 election the Democrats gained unusually large majorities in Congress and began a major expansion of the welfare state. 1964-65 can be labelled the culmination of liberalism because domestic policies advocated by ideological liberal but blocked in Congress for a generation were finally enacted.
However this shift to the left was controversial and spurred a counter mobilization on the political right. Liberal control of Congress ended in the midterm election of 1966 and a period of prolonged Ideological Polarization began. The Vietnam War and new social issues came more to the forefront in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Republican president Richard Nixon's attempt to secure American hegemony in the wake of the defeat in Vietnam led to the new foreign policy doctrine which at the time was called detente, but which is perhaps better understood today as Hegemonic Engagement. Hegemonic Engagement was endorsed by Nixon's successors, the Republican Ford and the Democrat Carter. Yet it was intensely opposed by the right wing of Nixon's own party. Ronald Reagan challenged the new ideological constructions of the 1960s and 1970s in his 1976 bid for the Republican nomination which almost unseated incumbent Jerry Ford.
By 1980s the conservative Reagan forces were in control of the Republican party. Reagan won the Republican nomination and the general election against Democrat Carter, promising to reverse the leftward swing of the public philosophy and public policy. Reagan was able to craft an ideological majority in Congress that passed new budget priorities in 1981. But in the midterm election of 1982 Reagan's coalition lost control of Congress. Reagan, his successor George Bush, and conservative Republicans in Congress continued to campaign for a new conservative public philosophy, but they were largely stymied by Democratic majorities in Congress. In 1994 the Repubicans gained control of both houses of Congress and tried once again to create a new conservative ideological majority, but they were thwarted by Democratic President Clinton. The period from 1983-2000 can best be described as a period of Conservative Incrementalism. In some sense the Reagan Restoration turned the ideological tides. Self-proclaimed liberals have almost disappeared from the political radar. Conservativism is the philosophy that is on the offensive, but it has faced substanial resistance from various centrist forces, particularly the Democratic party, that has retained control of either the Congress or the presidency throughout this entire period. Conservatism has not been able to successfully institutionalize its public philosophy the way liberalism was in the period from 1933-1972. Not yet, anyway.